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B OOK R EVIEW
L UCY R EED , J AN PAULSSON , AND N IGEL B LACKABY, G UIDE TO ICSID
A RBITRATION (2d ed., 2011).

Jack J. Coe, Jr.*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, investor-State arbitration has inspired an impressive array of high-quality
commentary in a range of forms and fora. The public domain is graced by numerous books,1 dozens of
journal articles,2 and abundant offerings seeming to appear spontaneously in the digital realm. The topic
has been pursued with distinction at the Hague Academy3 and in other prominent lecture series.4 Several
empirical studies testing our assumptions have also emerged.5 Judging, moreover, from the stillincreasing number of theses devoted to investor-State topics, the sense that more remains to be said
continues to thrive among academic supervisors and entry level scholars.6 Certainly, the topic
persistently features in a significant percentage of the many arbitration–related conferences regularly
sponsored by learned and professional societies.

* Professor of Law, Pepperdine University.
1
Among the many bound works and collections of essays are: ARBITRATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES: PROCEDURAL
AND SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL ASPECTS (Norbert Horn ed., 19th ed. 2004); INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING
CASES FROM THE ICSID, NAFTA, BILATERAL TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (Todd Weiler ed., 2005); NAFTA
INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: PAST ISSUES, CURRENT PRACTICE, FUTURE PROSPECTS (Todd Weiler ed., 2004); CAMPBELL
MCLACHLAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES (2008); THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION (Catherine A. Rogers & Roger P. Alford eds., 2009).
2
For a non-exhaustive bibliography comprising fourteen pages (limited to NAFTA Chapter Eleven subjects alone), see 1
Charles H. Brower II et al., NAFTA Chapter Eleven Reports, 683-99 (2006); see also ICSID,
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDBibliographyRH&actionVal=ViewArticleAndBooks (last visited
May 28, 2012).
3
Concerning ICSID, essential reading is Aron Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other States, 136 RECUEIL DES COURS (HAGUE ACADEMY OF INT’L L.) 330 (1972) (discussing
the history of the ICSID Convention). More recently at the Academy, Professor Jose Alvarez examined the Investor-State field
more broadly. See Jose E. Alavarez, The Public International Law Regime Governing International Investment, 344 RECUEIL
DES COURS (HAGUE ACADEMY OF INT’L L.) 195 (2011).
4
See James Crawford, Professor, Jesus College at Cambridge University, Address at the 22nd Freshfields Lecture on
International Arbitration, in London (Nov. 29, 2007),
http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/Media/lectures/pdf/Freshfields%20Lecture%202007.pdf.
5
See Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2007);
Susan D. Franck, Rationalizing Costs in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 769, 805–38 (2011); Susan D.
Franck, The ICSID Effect? Considering Potential Variations in Arbitration Awards, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 825 (2011) [hereinafter
ICSID Effect].
6
Such theses often result in excellent monographs. See, e.g., IOANA TUDOR, THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT
STANDARD IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT (2008) (resulting from doctoral research at the European
University Institute in Florence).
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The investor-State arbitration story is intimately linked in turn to the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention)7
and the center it created—the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID or the
Centre). The Convention, and hence the Centre, have been examined in at least one substantial treatise,8
and in several shorter works. Among the latter is Reed, Paulsson and Blackaby, Guide to ICSID
Arbitration (the Guide), first published in 2004, which has recently appeared in a second, thoroughly
revised, edition.9 As will be clear from a comparison of the first and second editions, much has transpired
at ICSID in recent years. Although the Guide aims to be a concise, reliable desk reference rather than a
policy oriented commentary of the academic sort, in succeeding at its task it manages to touch upon many
of the compelling themes that surround investor–State arbitration and the substantial literature it has
prompted. Some of these themes are surveyed below.

II.

THE CONVENTION’S UNDERPINNING RATIONALE AND PREMISES

Unlike most other administering institutions, ICSID exists to serve development goals.10 Its
undergirding supposition is that private investment flows are more likely to occur if prospective investors
know that such disputes as may arise with the host country can be referred to an effective disputes regime
that both functions independently of the host State’s local courts and has the imprimatur of the World
Bank.11 As part of this calculus, host States are in effect offered a bargain. Among other inducements, in
exchange for participation in the ICSID Convention regime, host States are assured that once the ICSID
Convention process has been initiated by the investor, the investor’s home State will be greatly restrained

7

International Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar.
18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
8
A leading commentary on the ICSID Convention is CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY
(2d ed. 2009).
9
LUCY REED ET AL., GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION (2d ed. 2011) [hereinafter GUIDE]. This edition of the Guide contains
468 pages—more than twice as many pages as are found in the first edition. It remains compact and portable, however. Its
dimensions are roughly 6 inches by 8 inches by 1 inch. The second edition also retains many of the structural features of the first
edition. For example, the book’s six chapters unfold under the original headings: 1) Introduction to ICSID; 2) Contractual ICSID
Arbitration; 3) ICSID Investment Treaty Arbitration; 4) ICSID Arbitration Procedure; 5) The ICSID Review Regime; and 6)
Recognition, Enforcement and Execution of ICSID Awards.
The book’s primary materials have been updated. Among other features, the Second Edition’s appendices contain wellchosen documents such as the ICSID Convention and current rules sets, NAFTA Chapter 11, the Energy Charter Treaty, and two
BITs (the UK Model text, and the US-Argentina BIT). There is also a comprehensive list of cases, a selective bibliography, and
an exceedingly useful series of tables dissecting issue-by-issue the ICSID docket to date (a feature introduced in the new edition).
Its index is sensibly organized mainly around individual ICSID Rules and Convention Articles.
10
Id. at 3-4.
11
See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and MIGA, I
ICSID REV.-FILJ 1 (1986); IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, LEGAL TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT: THE WORLD BANK GUIDELINES
97 n.68 (1993) (ICSID sponsored by the World Bank to help increase investment flows by establishing disputes machinery
detached from domestic courts); News Release, ICSID, Designations to the ICSID Panels of Conciliators and of Arbitrators by
the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council (Sept. 15, 2011),
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame
&FromPage=Announcements&pageName=Announcement95 (indicating that private capital flows remain ICSID’ principal aim).
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in its ability to exert diplomatic protection on behalf of its aggrieved national. 12 Investors, in turn, will
also be limited in the extent to which they might seek local court remedies during the arbitration.13
C A S E L O A D 14

III.

ICSID’s standing as the leading administering institution associated with investor-State
arbitration can readily be substantiated by examining its case-load. 15 As of the beginning of 2012, the
ICSID docket of concluded and pending cases comprised well over 360 arbitrations, involving claims
totaling many billions of dollars. While its case-load is less impressive when viewed in light of the nearly
five decades during which ICSID has been available to claimants, to amortize the docket in that way
obscures the two extremes that punctuate ICSID’s history: a long glacial period beginning with the
Convention’s coming into effect in late 1966 (a period characterized by a very modest caseload) disturbed
rather abruptly by a sudden, but subsequently steady, stream of claims beginning in the late-1990s. Thus,
ICSID’s Annual Report for 1994 reported five pending cases, 16 whereas, as 2012 dawns, 140 cases are
on-going. The number of concluded cases in turn has reached 229.17
Paralleling the burgeoning docket, and to a large extent explaining it, is the breathtaking increase
in the number of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and analogous instruments that have come into
force during the last fifteen years. 18 Their significance for ICSID is both jurisdictional and substantive.
Most BITs extend a continuing host-State offer, conditionally made to qualifying investors, to arbitrate
investment claims. Under the terms of that undertaking, investors seeking to pursue BIT arbitration
commonly may resort to whichever of the two ICSID regimes 19applies to the dispute in question.20 By
12

GUIDE, supra note 9, at 190.
Id. at 50. Under the Convention and associated procedural rules, a disputant may seek interim remedies from a domestic
court only if both parties have agreed to permit such petitions. Id. at 147.
14
Id. at 6-9.
15
See ICSID Effect, supra note 5, at 839.
16
INT’L CTR. FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1994).
17
Cf. Roberto Danino, Secretary General, ICSID, Opening Remarks at the Conference: Making the Most of Investment
Agreements: A Common Agenda (Dec. 12, 2005), available at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/internationalinvestment/internationalinvestmentagreements/36053800.pdf,
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListConcluded (by the end of 2005
there were 113 pending cases, representing “exponential growth”).
18
See GUIDE, supra note 9, at 57-58 (majority of cases now BIT cases); UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959–
1999, iii, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2 (2000), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/Docs/poiteiiad2.en.pdf (describing the
“rapid increase” in BITs during the 1990s, amounting to a nearly a five-fold increase between the end of the 1980s and the end of
the 1990s).
19
ICSID Convention arbitration is not available unless both the host State and the investor’s home State have become
parties to the ICSID Convention (typically by ratification). GUIDE, supra note 9, at 24-25, 32-35. When one of the two States
involved has ratified the Convention, ICSID Additional Facility Rules Arbitration may still be available. Id. at 17-19; Indeed, the
Additional Facility has been pressed into service in recent years for NAFTA Chapter Eleven disputes. Of the three NAFTA
States, only the United States has ratified the ICSID Convention, with the consequence that a claim involving only Mexico (as
home or host State) and Canada (as home or host State), does not qualify for Additional Facility arbitration. See generally Jack J.
Coe, Jr., Domestic Court Control of Investment Awards: Necessary Evil or Achilles Heel Within NAFTA and the Proposed
FTAA?, 19 J. INT’L ARB. 185 (2002) [hereinafter Coe, Achilles Heel]. A U.S. investor’s choice under Chapter Eleven is thus
between UNCITRAL Rules arbitration and Additional Facility Arbitration. The two regimes have in common a role for the
courts of the seat of arbitration not present in ICSID Convention Arbitration. GUIDE, supra note 9, at 17-19. Global enforcement
of Additional Facility and UNCITRAL Rules awards are similarly subject to the “refusal” grounds found in the fifth articles of
the New York and Panama Conventions. Id.; Coe, Achilles Heel, supra at 194-96.
13
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setting forth substantive treatment assurances, BITs also supply the governing standards by which the
arbitrators will judge the Respondent State’s conduct in the case at hand.21
Since a given State’s BIT promise to arbitrate redounds to many potential claimants, and because
a given State may have made dozens of such promises, regulatory acts by a State that generate sectorwide effects can give rise to dozens of claims. Argentina alone, for instance, has been named respondent
in scores of claims involving several BITs, the majority of those claims arising out of the drastic
economic measures implemented in an effort to stabilize Argentina’s economy.22 This multiplier effect
explains much about the precipitous growth in ICSID’s work-load in recent years, and about the
disaffection that some States now hold for ICSID.23
The BIT-centric caseload of contemporary ICSID can in some senses be traced to Chapter Eleven
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA Chapter Eleven). The initial claimants to test
treaty-based arbitral remedies were investors relying on NAFTA Chapter Eleven. They enjoyed success
sufficient to signal to some—misleadingly—that NAFTA’s BIT analogue offered somewhat predictable
recompense for those prejudiced by government mistreatment.24 As a longer view would demonstrate,
however, the settlement in Ethyl Corp,25 and the award in Metalclad26 were unusual events in Chapter
Eleven history.27 Nevertheless, those early claimant successes and the growing availability of equivalent
treaty remedies caught the attention of investors and of firms large and small.

IV.

COMPETING REGIMES AND INSTITUTIONS

The reader hoping to find in the Guide an elaborate discussion of arbitration under the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law Rules (UNCITRAL Rules) will be disappointed (but
presumably not surprised given the title of the book). Yet, in its modern BIT context, ICSID arbitration is
pursued as an election, a choice ordinarily between two arbitral options.28 As noted above, a typical
20
See Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV.-FILJ 232, 233 (1995) (discussing consensual basis upon which
non-privity investors may pursue legal rights directly); Andrea K. Bjorklund, Contract Without Privity: Sovereign Offer and
Investor Acceptance, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 183, 183 (2001) (examining NAFTA claims by investors who have no privity of contract
with the government). By design, a State’s ratification of the ICSID Convention is required but not sufficient to oblige it to
arbitrate. See GUIDE, supra note 9, at 35. Rather, consent covering the particular dispute involved must also be established; in
contemporary practice, BITs and similar treaties (now numbering approximately 3,000) supply that predicate. ICSID arbitrations
in which consent derives from a contract have become the exception, and constitute a relatively small percentage of the total
number of ICSID cases. Id. at 53.
21
See id. at 58-106; KENNETH VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES POLICY AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 2010).
22
See Alvarez, supra note 3, at 368-434.
23
See infra notes 50-54 accompanying text.
24
See Jack J. Coe, Jr., Taking Stock of NAFTA Chapter Eleven in its Tenth Year, An Interim Sketch of Selected Themes,
Issues and Methods, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1381, 1384-85 (2003) [hereinafter Coe, Taking Stock].
25
Ethyl v. Canada ended in settlement after the tribunal’s award on jurisdiction rejecting Canada’s request for dismissal.
Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, Award on Jurisdiction, June 24, 1998, 38 I.L.M.708 (1999). Reportedly, Ethyl Corp. received $13
million dollars to settle. See Todd Weiler, The Ethyl Arbitration: First of Its Kind and Harbinger of Things to Come, 11 AM.
REV. INT’L ARB. 187, 198 (2000); Alan C. Swan, INTERNATIONAL DECISION: Ethyl Corporation v. Canada, Award on Jurisdiction
(Under NAFTA/UNCITRAL) 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 159, 160 (2000).
26
Todd Weiler, Metalclad v. Mexico: A Play in Three Parts, 2 J. WORLD INVEST. 685 (2001).
27
See Coe, Taking Stock, supra note 24, at 1459 (table of outcomes through 2003).
28
See Stephen Jagush & Jeffrey Sullivan, A Comparison of ICSID and UNCITRAL Rules Arbitration: Areas of Divergence
and Concern, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY (Michael Waibel et al, eds., 2010); Piero
Bernardini, ICSID Verses Non-ICSID Investment Treaty Arbitration 2 (Sept. 15, 2009), http://www.arbitrationicca.org/media/0/12970223709030/bernardini_icsid-vs-non-icsid-investent.pdf.
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modern BIT gives investors standing to press claims through ICSID. Ordinarily, however, there is a
second arbitral option. Often, that option is UNCITRAL Rules arbitration. When the available ICSID
option is Additional Facility arbitration, the choice between it and the UNCITRAL Rules does not
involve fundamentally different systems; both are “seat” oriented regimes that envision a central role for
the New York Convention and that permit domestic courts to exercise various forms of supervision over
the arbitration and the resulting award.29
When the two relevant States’ have ratified the ICSID Convention, by contrast, the alternatives
facing the investor are more divergent. An investor’s designation of the ICSID option in such
circumstances is an election to pursue a-national arbitration in which the seat of arbitration is of little
significance and local courts have a subdued role.
Whichever ICSID option obtains, however, investors often prefer to proceed under the
UNCITRAL Rules, although the reasons for doing so vary with each investor. Generally, the lack of an
institutional structure and of a second tier of treaty provisions may appeal to claimants seeking flexibility,
added confidentially and local court access. The UNCITRAL Rules, moreover (even before the recent
revisions to them)30 have proven serviceable over many years—perhaps most notably at the Iran-U.S
Claims Tribunal where they have served for over three decades.31 Relatedly, numerous commentaries
explore the UNCITRAL Rules, thus providing considerable guidance.32 Because several institutions are
willing to administer UNCITRAL Rules arbitrations involving States, the parties need not necessarily
forgo institutional support when the clamant elects the UNCITRAL Rules option.33 In any event, the
regularity with which the UNCITRAL Rules have governed BIT disputes suggests that ICSID arbitration,
while accounting for the majority of investor-State proceedings, is by no means the whole story.34

V.

FINALITY VERSUS QUALITY CONTROL

Consistent with ICSID’s purposeful detachment from domestic legal systems, ICSID Convention
awards are not subject to annulment proceedings in municipal courts; nor is enforcement of such awards
subject to defensive arguments under grounds of the types specified in the New York and Panama
Conventions. Rather, in place of domestic court control is an internal regime by which ICSID
Convention awards are, at the request of a party, tested against enumerated grounds set forth in the
Convention.35 The task of ruling on an annulment request is given not to a domestic court but to an ad

30

See JAN PAULSSON & GEORGIOS PETROCHILOS, REVISION OF THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES,
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/news/arbrules_report.pdf (unofficial report).
31
See generally Howard Holtzmann, Drafting the Rules of the Tribunal, in THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL
AND THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS RESOLUTION 75 (David Caron & John Crook eds., 2000).
32
Among these are: LEE CAPLAN & DAVID CARON, THE 2010 UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES: A COMMENTARY (2010);
DAVID CARON & MATTI PELLONPAA, THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED 7-8 (1995); JACOMIJN J.
VAN HOF, COMMENTARY ON THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES 5 (1991).
33
The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) has attracted a number of investor-State arbitrations in the last ten years. The
PCA website indicates that nearly four dozen proceedings in which a State or State entity is a party have been lodged with the
Permanent Court. See http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1029.
34
Franck, ICSID Effect, supra note 5, at 840.
35
See GUIDE, supra note 9, at 159-177; Andrea Giardina, ICSID: A Self-Contained, Non-National Review System, in
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: TOWARDS “JUDICIALIZATION” AND UNIFORMITY? 199 (Richard B. Lillich &
Charles N. Brower eds., 1994).
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hoc committee constituted only for the particular award in question; it is the annulment rulings of such
committees that have generated much debate.36
When annulment is granted the question naturally arises whether quality control and finality—
both elements affecting systemic legitimacy—have been properly balanced. Even when not successful,
annulment proceedings generally add many months to the arbitration in question; and when an award is
annulled, the process often starts anew, with the second arbitration sometimes lasting longer than the first
one.37 In light of the exclusive and restrained annulment grounds found in Article 52 of the ICSID
Convention, which do not contemplate merits review for errors of fact or law,38 one might expect that
annulments would be rare. In fact, they have not been so rare.39
As the Guide notes, ICSID annulment practice can be thought of as passing through distinctive
40
periods. Its early (some would say “notorious”) period was characterized by annulment committees that
attracted robust criticism for having too willingly second-guessed the arbitrators.41 Then came a period of
recalibration (typified by “more measured” ad hoc committee holdings)42 followed by a third generation
involving the first attacks against BIT-based awards.43 The most recent instances of these BIT-related
proceedings, it seems, have introduced a return to greater intervention by ad hoc committees, reminiscent
– some would say – of the earliest, much criticized, annulment proceedings.44
Those that would favor robust scrutiny of ICSID awards can rightly stress that once an award
clears the ICSID system–unlike the New York Convention regime with which it competes45–there is no
secondary layer of control; States must enforce the pecuniary obligation contained in the award without
reference even to their own rules of public policy.46 In such circumstances, it might be argued that awarddebtor States and enforcing States alike deserve awards that are tightly reasoned and that demonstrate
jurisdictional self-restraint.47 States, so goes the argument, are not merely commercial entities whose
primary stakeholders are shareholders.
The insistence on lucid and coherent reasoning that often preoccupies ad hoc committees, in turn,
promotes awards that give guidance to States and investors in the individual case and contributes to a
more satisfactory and durable jurisprudence. These salutary goals are undercut, of course, to the extent
that ad hoc committees diverge in the standards they apply,48 and there no doubt comes a point at which
36

See generally W. Michael Reisman, The Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in ICSID Arbitration, 1989 DUKE L.J. 739
(1989) [hereinafter Breakdown].
37
See generally Jack J. Coe, Jr., Settlement of Investor-State Disputes through Mediation—Preliminary Remarks on
Processes, Problems and Prospects, in ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRAL AWARDS AGAINST SOVEREIGNS 73, 77-81 (R. Doak Bishop
ed., 2009) [hereinafter Prospects].
38
ICSID Convention, supra note 7, art. 52.
39
See Guide, supra note 9, at 401-05 (tables).
40
Id. at 162-74.
41
See Reisman, supra note 36.
42
See Guide, supra note 9, at 168.
43
Id. at 169.
44
Id. at 174.
45
See generally Albert Jan van den Berg, Refusals of Enforcement Under the New York Convention of 1958: The Unfortunate
Few, in ARBITRATION IN THE NEXT DECADE 75 (1999) (discussing grounds for refusal of enforcement of award).
46
See GUIDE, supra note 9, at 162-66.
47
Cf. Tai-Heng Chen, What’s Reasonable Depends Who’s Asking, 8 BALTIC Y.B. INT’L L. 389, 391-92 (2005) (reviewing
THE REASONS REQUIREMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CRITICAL STUDIES (Guillermo A. Alvarez & W. Michael Reisman
eds., 2008) and noting the suggestion that investor-State awards ought to be held to a higher standard of explicated reasoning).
48
See GUIDE, supra note 9, at 174-75 (ICSID has repeatedly appointed certain individuals to ad hoc committees to promote
coherent annulment jurisprudence). But see Franck, ICSID Effect, supra note 5, at 845 n.90 (describing complaints by counsel
concerning ad hoc committee over reaching).
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an assessment of reasoning quality, like a quest for excess of mandate,49 masks unauthorized merits
review.50

VI.

THE PERSPECTIVES OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Reaching the proper calibration of ICSID’s internal control machinery is a dilemma specific to
ICSID Convention arbitration. It subsists, however, within a broader and more multifaceted debate to
which investor-State arbitration has given rise, cabined under the “legitimacy” rubric. The notion that a
private enterprise might directly achieve through arbitration a monetary remedy for host–State violations
of BIT obligations has long been a central feature of BITs.51 Claims filed in the mid-1990’s under
NAFTA Chapter Eleven, however, alerted new cadres of observers to an arbitral mechanism that had
been in plain view for several decades, albeit without being regularly utilized. The resulting critiques
spanned a wide spectrum, varying both in orientation and in levels of authoritativeness.52 The associated
legitimacy assessments, sometimes unaided by a good grasp of context or historical perspective,53
questioned authority, process fairness and transparency in light of various societal interests and the
perceived quality and impact of outcomes.54 The system’s capacity for circumnavigating democratic
values and its vulnerability to being commandeered by wealthy multinationals were recurrent themes.55
These critiques have become more subdued, one might speculate, because of the implementation of

49

See ICSID Convention, supra note 7, art. 52(1)(b).
Cf. GUIDE, supra note 9, at 168 (appellate style review might threaten to undercut finality and thus investor confidence in
the dispute system).
51
See, e.g., Barton Legum, The Innovation of Investor-State Arbitration Under NAFTA, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 531 (2002)
(tracing the history of mixed claims processes and concluding that Chapter 11 is not fully unprecedented); Antonio R. Parra,
Provisions on the Settlement of Investment Disputes in Modern Investment Laws, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Multilateral
Instruments on Investment, 12 ICSID REV. 287 (1997) (direct arbitral standing for investors a common feature).
52
See generally Ari Afilalo, Towards a Common Law of International Investment: How NAFTA Chapter 11 Panels
Should Solve Their Legitimacy Crisis, 17 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 51 (2004); Charles H. Brower, II, Structure, Legitimacy, and
NAFTA 's Investment Chapter, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37 (2003); Naveen Gurudevan, An Evaluation of Current
Legitimacy-Based Objections to NAFTA's Chapter 11 Investment Dispute Resolution Process, 6 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 399 (2005);
Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through
Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005).
53
See Thomas Carbonneau, The Ballad of Transborder Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 773, 827 (2002) (“Nothing was
ever said - and, therefore, understood - about the larger operation and aspirations of NAFTA. The critics never bothered to
communicate an understanding of the difficulty of international adjudication or of how instrumental a functional system of
adjudication is to the pursuit of international trade.”); see id. (certain characterizations of Chapter 11 have been so misleading as
to amount to “misrepresentations pitched at a level of deceit”).
54
See, e.g., Anthony De Palma, NAFTA's Powerful Little Secret; Obscure Tribunals Settle Disputes, But Go Too Far,
Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001, at 1 (describing the investor-state arbitral process as a form of "secret government");
Editorial, The Secret Trade Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2004, at A1 (reform needed given “one-sided” arbitration process
favoring wealthy corporations over poor States).
55
See generally Bill Moyers Reports: Trading Democracy (PBS television broadcast), available at
http://www.pbs.org/now/printable/transcript_tdfull_print.html (last visited May 29, 2012). The fact that arbitrators are not
elected officials nor subject to appellate review, of course, must be viewed in light of a party’s ability to challenge an arbitrator if
significant conflicts of various types can be demonstrated. See GUIDE, supra note 9, at 133-37. Parties have regularly challenged
arbitrators. The GUIDE’s table on challenges lists thirty attempts leading to eight resignations. Some arbitrations have given rise
to multiple challenges; see also id. at 406-09.
50
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transparency-related reforms56 and data that demonstrate that claimants face more of a gauntlet than might
have seemed true based upon the earliest invocations of NAFTA Chapter Eleven.

VII. S T A T E “B A C K L A S H ”

AND

RELATED MATTERS

ICSID’s capacity for even-handedness is of course an important question. At least as to ICSID
arbitration, concerns that anti-State bias has infected the system seem not to be supported by the data,57
which suggest that choosing ICSID does not improve a claimant’s chances of winning or of maximizing a
recovery compared to other arbitral fora.58 Similarly, in smaller samples generated by ten years of
NAFTA Chapter Eleven arbitration (both under the UNCITRAL Rules and the Additional Facility) most
claims were unsuccessful and those that succeeded resulted in recoveries much lower than the amounts
sought.59 There have been, however, enough large recoveries to cause several States to reassess their
commitment to ICSID60 and, relatedly, to BITs that offer investors a direct arbitral remedy tied to
somewhat indeterminate standards of treatment. Although a macro view shows that ICSID membership
continues to grow, a few States—principally in the Americas—have withdrawn or threatened to withdraw
from the Convention.61 It does not follow, of course, that those States will denounce the BITs into which
they have entered, nor that they will refuse to comply with such ICSID awards as may have been
rendered; those are separate questions.62

VIII. K E E P I N G U P

WITH

AMPLIFIED CASELOADS

Among the other concerns voiced by observers in recent years has been that ICSID’s exploding
docket had outstripped its institutional capacities.63 In 2006, one well-informed observer of ICSID—an
institution which he called “the best run, best staffed, with the best rules and the best treaty”—spoke
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nevertheless of an institution “under threat,”64 an admonition apparently inspired by the budget priorities
set by the World Bank.65 Equally, users of ICSID might well have noticed with dismay the recent period
in which ICSID’s leadership changed with surprising frequency.66 Such a revolving door effect could not
have promoted forward looking agendas or stability, particularly while caseloads continued to enlarge
apace.

IX.

TRANSPARENCY

Among the legitimacy-related themes underscored by many observers was the need to introduce
greater “transparency” into the system.67 Prefigured by NAFTA policies, States have increasingly
accepted that a measure of openness in the investor-State process is desirable, and perhaps inevitable.68
With few obstacles enshrined in the ICSID Convention, the Centre was able to act in accordance with an
obvious trend to accomplish enhanced access through ICSID Rules changes; those occurred in 2006.69
The Rules amendments70 embellish what had already been ICSID’s policy of relative openness by
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authorizing tribunals to accept amicus filings, subject to certain conditions,71 and to permit non-disputants
to observe hearings, provided neither party objects.72
Amicus filings had been accepted even before the ICSID Rules changes, and several tribunals
have been prepared since the revisions to allow such submissions.73 Indeed, at least among some
arbitrators, there has developed the view that to permit amicus submissions in appropriate circumstances
“is an important element in the overall discharge of the Arbitral Tribunal’s mandate, and in securing
wider confidence in the arbitral process itself.”74

X.

JURISPRUDENTIAL COHERENCE IN THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS

ICSID’s cardinal role in investor-State arbitration places it in the center of another legitimacyrelated debate; that examining whether the investment and arbitral jurisprudence being produced is
sufficiently principled and coherent to guide and treat fairly States and investors. An ordered system of
precedent constraining tribunals does not formally operate in the investor-State realm. Even though
tribunals are generally alerted by the parties to the reasoning of other tribunals, markedly divergent
analyses have been applied to substantially similar BIT texts. Fully settled understandings therefore have
not become associated with the oft-examined concepts of “fair and equitable treatment,”75 “measures
tantamount to expropriation,” “full protection and security,”76 “umbrella” clauses77 and the “most favored
nation” guarantee.78
The much discussed solution of instituting an appellate mechanism of some type,79 though
supported by many States and commentators,80 has yet to be pursued in a concrete fashion. As a partial
solution to the problem of “ad hockery,” some arbitrators have announced that they will adopt established
trends when they perceive them, rather than further splinter BIT jurisprudence by formulating de novo
rules of decision in each case.81
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XI.

ADR—O N T H E H O R I Z O N ?

As the Guide explains, the ICSID’s Convention established a conciliation regime.82 Conciliation,
however, has not been used often.83 A number of commentators from practice, government and academia
nevertheless have suggested that the existing investor-State disputes mechanism could benefit from more
routine use of mediation (conciliation).84
It is a fact that investor-State disputes often settle, and that mediation has enjoyed good success
with respect to B-to-B disputes. It is plausible therefore that investor-State settlement rates might be
increased by introducing a dynamic third-party process proven capable in other contexts of generating
(sometimes very quickly) more satisfactory outcomes than bilateral negotiations alone. At present, those
investor-State cases that settle often do so only after appreciable costs have been incurred. Those that do
not settle, in turn, generally require each side to commit significant resources to the arbitration enterprise
and to cope with considerable disruption in pursuit of an outcome that typically is uncertain.85
The ICSID Secretariat has expressed interest in exploring ADR of a more dynamic kind than that
contemplated in the Convention. It will be complemented in its efforts by work at the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)86 and the International Bar Association.87

XII. A W O R T H Y B O O K
Given the existing rich array of reference material touching upon investor-State disputes, one is
entitled to ask whether another book on investor-State arbitration could be justified, even one merely
updating an existing work. In its coverage, conciseness, reliability, compact format and step-saving
attributes, the Guide’s second edition should stand up well to scrutiny. Certainly in terms of the
developments to have occurred since 2004, the second edition needs little justification: there have been
revisions to the ICSID Arbitration Rules and considerable jurisprudence developed during the last few
years, and although the book is not principally about substantive investor protection law, its synopses of
common BIT protections as construed by tribunals are clear and surprisingly comprehensive.88
The book additionally has several features that make it unlikely to be ignored by counsel when
briefing a client or preparing to launch an ICSID case. Particularly noteworthy are the Guide’s tables.
How often has an expropriation been established and in which cases? (See Table II F). Which cases have
found breaches of umbrella clauses or of the promise of fair and equitable treatment? (See Table II, G
and A). Which arbitrators have been willing to award costs and how regularly have costs been granted?
82
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(See Table III D). How often have challenges to arbitrators been successful? (See Table III C). Those
who have investigated these and similar questions by searching the available websites will readily
appreciate the amount of work the authors have done for the reader.89
Given the foregoing, ICSID experts—both counsel and arbitrators—should find the reference a
reliable traveling companion, while newcomers to the field ought to regard it as required reading.
Certainly, my students have found the book an efficient vehicle by which to acquire quickly a solid
understanding of the ICSID regime and BIT jurisprudence before digging in more deeply. This “market
test” would seem to bode well for the book’s utility in the hands of others. In short, the second edition of
the Guide is both a wonderful research tool and a reliable reference that seems to have no counterpart in
the market. It makes a distinctive contribution.
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